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1181 
Privatized Cybersecurity Law 
Ido Kilovaty* 
Tech companies have gradually and informally assumed the role of international 
lawmakers on global cybersecurity issues. But while it might seem as if the international 
community and Internet users are the direct beneficiaries of private tech industries’ involvement 
in making law, there are many questions about this endeavor that require a thorough 
examination. The end goal and risks associated with such ventures are largely obscure  
and unexplored. 
This Article provides an analysis of how tech companies are effectively becoming 
regulators on global cybersecurity, based on states’ inability to overcome geopolitical divides on 
how cyberspace ought to be regulated globally. This Article looks primarily at three separate 
proposals representing the larger trend of the privatization of cybersecurity law: the Digital 
Geneva Convention, the Cyber Red Cross, and the Cybersecurity Tech Accord. These, as well 
as other initiatives, reflect the gradual and uncontested assimilation of private tech companies 
into the machinery of international lawmaking. 
This Article argues that state governments, civil society organizations, Internet users, 
and other stakeholders need to step back and carefully evaluate the dangers of ceding too much 
lawmaking control and authority to the private tech sector. These private actors, while not yet 
on an equal footing to states, are increasingly displacing states as they seek to create their own 
privatized and unaccountable version of cybersecurity law. 
  
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INTRODUCTION 
The global regulation of cybersecurity is one of the most contentious topics 
on the international legal plane.1 States, which are perceived as the most suitable 
entities to regulate cyberspace globally, are largely incapable of reaching a consensus 
on what such law would look like due to their geopolitical differences.2 In this 
 
1. David P. Fidler, The UN Secretary-General’s Call for Regulating Cyberwar Raises More 
Questions than Answers, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/un-
secretary-generals-call-regulating-cyberwar-raises-more-questions-answers  [https://perma.cc/63XS-
429C] (“How these [international law] rules apply in cyberspace has been extensively discussed across 
the UN and elsewhere for many years, often with controversy overshadowing consensus.”). 
2. JACK GOLDSMITH, CYBERSECURITY TREATIES: A SKEPTICAL VIEW 4 (2011) (“For most 
cybersecurity issues, it is not clear that a mutually beneficial deal is possible in theory . . . . [T]here are 
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structural and normative vacuum, tech companies are seizing the opportunity to 
create norms and rules for cyber operations, essentially creating a privatized version 
of cybersecurity law.3 
This “governmentalization” of private tech companies is occurring in many 
contexts that were previously government-regulated.4 For example, many tech 
companies have recently begun to perform a quasi-judicial function within their 
platforms.5 Amazon is but one example of a company where judicial functions are 
privatized through the widely used dispute resolution system between vendors and 
consumers.6 Facebook’s “Supreme Court” is another instance of a tech company 
deciding to make certain quasi-judicial determinations on content moderation, 
reflecting the overall trend of governmentalization in tech.7 
Tech companies’ desire for power through governmentalization is also 
currently reshaping the international legal regulation of cybersecurity. By 
international legal regulation of cybersecurity, I mean the international law 
applicable to cyberspace, as the “fifth domain” of warfare,8 where state 
governments and non-state actors are acting in offense and defense, and civilians 
are victimized by cyber operations. In this domain, Microsoft is leading the charge 
in creating norms that would govern the law applicable to global cybersecurity,9 a 
 
deep and fundamental clashes not only over what practices should be outlawed but also and more 
broadly over what the problem is.”); Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State 
Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565, 640–41 (2018) (“For a variety of reasons, 
however, a constitutive cybersecurity treaty may not be possible, especially if it attempts to regulate 
state conduct. At the most basic level, there are few cyber-related subjects that permit mutually 
beneficial deals for states with differing technological capabilities, differing vulnerabilities, and differing 
beliefs about the appropriate amount of governmental control over the internet or the dangers posed 
by free speech. Indeed, not only do states desire to regulate different activities in cyberspace, many 
states see others’ proposed norms as being antithetical to their own concerns.”). 
3. See Shin-yi Peng, “Private” Cybersecurity Standards? Cyberspace Governance, 
Multistakeholderism, and the (Ir)relevance of the TBT Regime, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 445, 450 (2018) 
(arguing that “privatization of governance” is a result of “governments’ lack of requisite technical 
expertise and the flexibility to deal with ever-more complex regulatory tasks”). 
4. See Janosik  Herder,  The  Power  of  Platforms,  PUB.  SEMINAR  (Jan. 25, 2019), https:// 
publicseminar.org/essays/the-power-of-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/5HT6-NGAB]. 
5. Frank Pasquale, Digital Capitalism—How to Tame the Platform Juggernauts, WISO DIREKT 
( June 2018), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/wiso/14444.pdf [https://perma.cc/49DG-TWE3]; see also 
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131  
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1617 (2018). 
6. Pasquale, supra note 5, at 2–3; Jane K. Winn, The Secession of the Successful: The Rise of 
Amazon as Private Global Consumer Protection Regulator, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 201–03 (2016) 
(explaining how platforms, Amazon in particular, are governors with respect to dispute resolution 
between consumers and vendors). 
7. Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s Supreme Court Work, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebook-supreme-court-speech.html 
[https://perma.cc/F7VP-CPKT]. 
8. War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST ( July 1, 2010), https://www.economist.com/briefing/ 
2010/07/01/war-in-the-fifth-domain [https://perma.cc/C67T-W3JM]. 
9. Brad Smith, The Need for a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/ [https:// 
perma.cc/9NN6-7SGM]. For a summary of how Microsoft’s endeavors fit in with in the broader 
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phenomenon some refer to as norm entrepreneurship.10 These norms are the 
binding directives that seek to protect Internet users from state-sponsored 
cyberattacks and strengthen their cybersecurity protection.11 
There are many good reasons for Microsoft to take the lead in developing such 
norms. The primary explanation is that Internet users are vulnerable, and their 
vulnerability, particularly to state-sponsored activity online, negatively impacts the 
reputation of and trust in the tech industry.12 After all, Internet users in such cases 
could see their personal information compromised,13 access to banking and 
emergency services curtailed,14 or devices such as vehicles,15 pacemakers,16 
webcams,17 and insulin pumps hacked.18 These are all real and documented 
 
picture of private-sector cyber norms, see ANGELA MCKAY ET AL., MICROSOFT, INTERNATIONAL 
CYBERSECURITY NORMS: REDUCING CONFLICT IN AN INTERNET-DEPENDENT WORLD (2014), 
http://aka.ms/cybernorms [https://perma.cc/4R6E-RBPA]; Garrett Hinck, Private-Sector Initiatives  
for Cyber Norms: A Summary, LAWFARE ( June 25, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/private-sector- 
initiatives-cyber-norms-summary [https://perma.cc/P83B-H65M]. 
10. Tim Maurer, Private Companies Take the Lead on Cyber Security, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May 
4, 2018),  https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/private-companies-take-the-lead-on-cyber-security/ 
[https://perma.cc/5S3F-BKCF]; see also Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Norms for Global 
Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 425, 447 (2016) (“Norm entrepreneurs are critical to norm emergence 
not only because they call attention to an issue but because they frame it—they use language that names, 
interprets, and dramatizes the problem—and on that basis propose a norm to address it.”). 
11. Brad Smith, 34 Companies Stand Up for Cybersecurity with Tech Accord, MICROSOFT  
(Apr. 17, 2018),  https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/04/17/34-companies-stand-up-
for-cybersecurity-with-a-tech-accord/ [https://perma.cc/FP8T-98PJ ] (introducing the four governing 
principles of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord). 
12. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 502–03 (2017) 
(listing the incentives for the tech industry to pursue public-private partnerships in global cybersecurity, 
including that “the public-relations benefits of some of the actions are substantial,” for example, 
“attributing cyber intrusions to state-sponsored attackers is excellent advertising”). 
13. Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 987 (2018) (“A day rarely 
passes without another report of a major cybersecurity incident. Hackers routinely breach the systems 
of retailers, stealing consumer credit card data, social security numbers, and other valuable  
personal information.”). 
14. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (Aug. 21, 
2007, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/ [https://perma.cc/RKZ9-DHGZ] 
(describing cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 that disabled access to banking, emergency, and 
government services). 
15. Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, WIRED ( July 
21, 2015, 6:00 AM),  https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/ 
[https://perma.cc/4FHN-HDKK]. 
16. Lily Hay Newman, A New Pacemaker Hack Puts Malware Directly on the Device, WIRED 
(Aug. 9, 2018, 12:30 PM),  https://www.wired.com/story/pacemaker-hack-malware-black-hat/ 
[https://perma.cc/EA5Q-NJEV]. 
17. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, How 1.5 Million Connected Cameras Were Hijacked to Make 
an Unprecedented Botnet, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 29, 2016, 9:03 AM), https://www.vice.com 
/en_us/article/8q8dab/15-million-connected-cameras-ddos-botnet-brian-krebs [https://perma.cc/ 
BE7R-P5WD]. 
18. Jim Finkle, J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pump Vulnerable to Hacking, REUTERS 
(Oct. 4, 2016, 4:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cyber-insulin-pumps-
e/jj-warns-diabetic-patients-insulin-pump-vulnerable-to-hacking-idUSKCN12411L [https://perma.cc 
/5HCU-GEFA]. 
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consequences of malicious cyberspace activity. With these potentially devastating 
consequences in mind, it is understandable why the next logical step would be to 
develop binding norms and rules to effectively deter such activity.19 
But there is a caveat, which is that private tech companies are de facto 
becoming the legislators of global cybersecurity law, with no guarantee of respect 
for values such as accountability,20 transparency, or fairness.21 And while the norms 
proposed by these companies may sound innocuous22—involving terms such as 
“peace,”23 “humanitarian,”24 and “Red Cross”25—a closer look reveals their 
potential difficulties. 
This Article argues that private tech companies are effectively becoming 
legislators of global cybersecurity law, with strings attached. This argument is 
grounded in the premise that states have failed to respond to this normative vacuum 
and are currently unable to do so.26 Accordingly, as Julie Cohen has recently argued, 
“dominant platforms’ role in the international legal order increasingly resembles that 
of sovereign states.”27 Tech companies’ increasing involvement in the international 
legal system is challenging its structure, values, and future. 
Some would contest the premise that states are unable or unwilling to regulate 
global cybersecurity. They claim that the international legal order, through  
long-standing principles and frameworks, already provides civilians a variety of 
 
19. Joseph Nye, Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace, 41 INT’L SECURITY 44, 60 (2017) (“A 
fourth mechanism by which dissuasion works is norms and taboos. Normative considerations can deter 
actions by imposing reputational costs that can damage an actor’s soft power beyond the value gained 
from a given attack.”). 
20. Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 101, 117 
(2011) (“Privatization has become a dominant reality of twenty-first-century governance. Accordingly, 
scholars and policymakers will need to seek new ways to embed core principles of accountability into 
this emerging form of state power.”). 
21. Eichensehr, supra note 12 (providing an in-depth analysis of the public law values implicated 
by public-private partnerships in cybersecurity). 
22. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 201 (2017) 
(arguing that platforms who self-identify as “conscientious, neutral stewards of the global digital 
infrastructure, set a lofty tone that elevates the more self-interested processes of strategic positioning 
operating continually in the background”). 
23. Demand Digital Peace Now,  MICROSOFT,  https://digitalpeace.microsoft.com/  [https:// 
perma.cc/B588-TME6]. 
24. Brad Smith, We Need to Modernize International Agreements to Create a Safer Digital World, 
MICROSOFT  (Nov. 10, 2017),  https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/11/10/need-
modernize-international-agreements-create-safer-digital-world/ [https://perma.cc/CYB9-Z6GN]. 
25. Smith, supra note 9. 
26. See, e.g., Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s 
Failure to Advance Cyber Norms,  JUST SECURITY  ( June 30, 2017),  https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/  [https://perma.cc/ 
5VCG-6F92]. 
27. Cohen, supra note 22, at 199–203 (providing various examples of platforms independently 
engaging in institutional and legal reform, and observing that “the role of platforms in the emergent 
global legal order is doubly under construction”). 
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protections from state-sponsored cyberattacks.28 Indeed, international law does 
protect civilians from government overreach in assorted ways under the auspices of 
international human rights law.29 These include their rights to life,30 due process,31 
privacy,32 assembly,33 speech,34 access to information,35 and even basic access to the 
Internet itself.36 Directing state-sponsored cyberattacks at civilians, depending on 
their effects, could potentially be in violation of these human rights obligations.37 
Additionally, once an armed conflict emerges, international humanitarian law offers 
its own set of protections with the aim of reducing the suffering and adverse 
consequences that are so endemic to war.38 For example, international humanitarian 
law prohibits the direct targeting of civilians by warring parties.39 Today, this reflects 
 
28. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 HARV. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3 
(2012) (“Yes, international law principles do apply in cyberspace. . . . [N]o. Cyberspace is not a  
‘law-free’ zone where anyone can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraint.”). 
29. Gabor Rona & Lauren Aarons, State Responsibility to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill Human 
Rights Obligations in Cyberspace, J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 503, 505 (2016) (“At the emergence of 
international human rights, it was anticipated that its principles would extend to all media, regardless of 
new technological advancements.”). 
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174–75 [hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
31. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175–76; UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 10. 
32. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 17(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177–78; UDHR, supra note 30, at  
art. 12. 
33. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 21, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 20(1). 
34. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 19. 
35. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 19. 
36. Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.20 ( June 27, 2016); David 
Kravets, U.N. Report Declares Internet Access a Human Right, WIRED ( June 3, 2011, 2:47 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2011/06/internet-a-human-right/  [https://perma.cc/22CA-JK89]  (“The 
Special Rapporteur calls upon all states to ensure that Internet access is maintained at all times, including 
during times of political unrest. In particular, the Special Rapporteur urges States to repeal or amend 
existing intellectual copyright laws which permit users to be disconnected from Internet access, and to 
refrain from adopting such laws.”). 
37. Some, however, would argue that the application of international human rights law to a 
cyberattack against civilians originating from abroad is not as straightforward. See Cordula Droege, Get 
Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians, 94 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 533, 547 (2012) (“[I]nternational human rights law might apply, but would a computer 
network attack, conducted from the other side of the globe against civilian infrastructure, fulfil the 
requirement of effective control for the purpose of applicability of human rights law? Also, to what 
extent would human rights law provide sufficient protection against the disruption of infrastructure the 
effects of which on the lives of civilians is not necessarily immediately identifiable?”). 
38. Hans-Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Nov. 30, 1998), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc 
/57jm93.htm [https://perma.cc/V3VX-ELXJ] (“[I]nternational rules which limit the effects of war 
on people and property, and which protect certain particularly vulnerable groups of persons. That is 
the goal of international humanitarian law, with the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
as its main expression and an important body of customary law as a decisive supplementary source  
of law.”). 
39. Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants, INT’L COMMITTEE 
RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1 [https://perma.cc/ 
6V8Z-ZGMN] (“The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and 
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indisputable and binding customary international law.40 By analogy, civilians ought 
to be protected from direct cyberattacks, as they are not directly involved in the 
conflict and therefore are not legitimate military objectives.41 Similarly, the same 
body of law restricts indirect harm to civilians by limiting the amount of permissible 
collateral damage involving civilians and their property.42 It may therefore appear as 
if, at least in theory, there is sufficient law applicable to state-sponsored cyberattacks.43 
While these assessments appear straightforward and backed by long-standing 
practice,44 emerging state activity—and most importantly the tech industry’s activity 
in cyberspace—makes these case-by-case assessments far more complicated than 
they may seem at first blush.45 Some questions that remain unresolved are: What 
does it mean to directly target a civilian using malware that is inherently indirect?46 
Does such targeting need to be lethal? Or would directly disabling civilian computer 
systems and networks also constitute a violation of that rule? Does collateral damage 
only mean deaths and injuries to civilians? Or does it include other harms, such as 
data loss, denial of service, manipulation, spread of fear and terror, and major 
inconvenience?47 Would election interference be in violation of international human 
 
combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed  
against civilians.”). 
40. Id. (“State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”). 
41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(2), opened for signature  
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 [hereinafter Protocol I] (“The civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”). 
42. Id. art. 51(5)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 (“[A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”). 
43. See generally Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817 
(2012) (detailing the various international law rules applicable to cyberattacks). 
44. Gary Brown & Keira Poellet, The Customary International Law of Cyberspace, STRATEGIC 
STUD. Q., Fall 2012, at 127 (“There is a body of customary law reflecting the extensive and virtually 
uniform conduct of nation-states during traditional warfare that is widely accepted and well 
understood—the law of war. Unfortunately, the application of the law of war to cyberspace is 
problematic because the actions and effects available to nations and nonstate actors in cyberspace do 
not necessarily match up neatly with the principles governing armed conflict.”). 
45. Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INT’L  
L. ONLINE 1 (2017) (identifying specific gaps in international law as it applies to cyberattacks). 
46. Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525,  
567–68 (2012) (“However, there are cyber attacks that deliberately target objects to kill civilians or 
destroy civilian objects. Such attacks are clearly unlawful under the law of armed conflict. In practice, 
however, cyber attacks targeting civilians have been more of an inconvenience than a threat to life  
or safety.”). 
47. Ido Kilovaty, Virtual Violence—Disruptive Cyberspace Operations as “Attacks” under 
International Humanitarian Law, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 113, 137–39 (2016) (“The 
primary shortcoming of a narrow reading of collateral damage is that the most severe disruptive cyber 
operations would be far more humanitarianly dangerous than physical destroying a house belonging to 
a civilian. That is to say, that disruption effects can be far more serious than physical ones. In that sense, 
reconsidering the scope of collateral damage is essential.”). 
First to Printer_Kilovaty.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/20  8:13 PM 
1188 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1181 
rights law?48 Or would dated conceptions of sovereignty and prohibited 
intervention limit such a determination? International law seems unable to answer 
these with a reasonable degree of specificity. 
These questions are far from theoretical. In fact, they represent a significant 
gap in international law that is not easily solvable. This indeterminacy poses a serious 
and immediate danger to civilians who find themselves in the midst of a cyber 
conflict. Tech companies that promote “norms,” “rules,” and “principles” for 
global cybersecurity realize that this point in time is an opportunity for them to seize 
the role of international lawmakers.49 Clearly, private entities have no authority to 
create “law” as that term is typically understood within the U.S. constitutional 
system. But internationally, tech companies may be able to create certain 
prescriptions that will affect state practice and eventually permeate legal systems, 
becoming authoritative without being grounded in the democratic legitimacy, public 
interest, or accountability expected from “real” legislators.50 This is largely enabled 
through customary international law—states’ repeated practices that create a sense 
of binding legal obligation.51 
This represents a departure from the state-centric approach of creating 
international law, a phenomenon which this Article calls the privatization of 
 
48. Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International 
Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2017) (“[I]t would seem as if Russia’s cyber intrusion violated the 
human rights of the owners of the various e-mail accounts, including John Podesta and several  
DNC officials.”). 
49. Maurer, supra note 10 (“[I]t is only the latest sign that what norms govern cyber space and 
the global governance of cyber security—or, rather, the lack thereof—have captured the attention of 
corporate boardrooms around the world.”). 
50. The term “real legislators” is somewhat elusive in the international legal context. Many have 
argued that non-state actors may be influencing international law in a variety of ways, a so-called 
“bottom-up” approach. See Jon P. Jurich, Cyberwar and Customary International Law: The Potential of a 
“Bottom-up” Approach to an International Law of Information Operations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 275 (2008); 
Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance 
Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, Beyond  
State-Centrism: International Law and Non-State Actors in Cyberspace, 21 J. CONF. & SECURITY  
L. 595 (2017). In the privacy law context, see Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97  
Wash. U. L. Rev. 773, 790–92 (2020) (describing the process of legal endogeneity—how privacy law is 
understood by corporations as a matter of compliance rather than a set of substantive privacy protections). 
51. Customary International Law, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE: WEX, https://www. 
law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law [https://perma.cc/ZE3T-RHNL] ( last visited 
Dec. 14, 2019) (“Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from established 
international practices, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written conventions and treaties. 
Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states that they follow 
from a sense of legal obligation.”). 
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cybersecurity law.52 This Article explores this new phenomenon53 while describing 
the trends that are currently reshaping the international legal order on cybersecurity. 
The primary purpose of this Article is to identify potential structural and normative 
difficulties arising from the tech industry’s growing involvement in international 
lawmaking. These difficulties should encourage states, civil society, and the public 
to step back and reexamine the privatization of cybersecurity law. Part I introduces 
the narrative of the emerging privatization of cybersecurity law led by the tech 
industry. Part II delves into how this phenomenon challenges and disrupts the 
international legal order, potentially heralding an important transformation of the 
basic tenets of international law. Part III explores the concrete ways in which the 
privatization of cybersecurity law is undermining norms and values such as 
democracy, transparency, accountability, and neutrality. In closing, I conclude with 
a call for caution with respect to the increasing regulatory role of private tech 
companies and a reconsideration of international law’s effort to regulate 
cybersecurity globally. 
I. PRIVATIZED CYBERSECURITY LAW 
Privatized cybersecurity law is the emerging phenomenon of tech companies 
creating rules, norms, and principles for conduct in cyberspace, primarily the 
conduct of states vis-à-vis other states and individual users.54 Private tech 
companies, for many reasons that this Article will cover, hold the view that it is their 
duty to protect civilians in cyberspace, whether proactively from state-sponsored 
cyberattacks or passively by enhancing civilian infrastructure security.55 While 
 
52. “Privatization” in that context does not necessarily pass any moral judgement on platforms’ 
endeavors to create global cybersecurity law. While this Article is generally critical of these steps, there 
are many other contexts where privatization of cybersecurity may actually be beneficial. See, e.g., Nathan 
Alexander Sales, Privatizing Cybersecurity, 65 UCLA L. REV. 620, 687–88 (2018) (looking at various 
market-based solutions to incentivize black-hat and gray-hat hackers to sell their vulnerabilities on the 
white-hat market; the author, while recognizing the benefits of the private sector in promoting 
cybersecurity, is nonetheless cautious, arguing “[t]here’s no question that the government has a critical 
role to play—indeed, the leading role—in securing cyberspace, whether through traditional means like 
law enforcement or through less conventional regulatory approaches”). 
53. In contrast, non-state actors have already been involved in influencing the outcomes of 
political and diplomatic negotiations. See Alex Grigsby, The End of Cyber Norms, 59 GLOBAL  
POL. & STRATEGY 109, 109 (2017) (“Think tanks, foundations and some technology companies joined 
in as norm entrepreneurs, hoping to make their mark on diplomatic negotiations.”). However, the 
phenomenon introduced by this Article—lawmaking by digital platforms—is different. 
54. See  A Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace,  MICROSOFT,  https://query.prod. 
cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW67QH [https://perma.cc/8WAW-CC9P]. 
55. Among the Cybersecurity Tech Accord’s commitments is one to “protect all of our users 
and customers everywhere,” which focuses on active protection “from cyberattacks—whether an 
individual, organization or government—irrespective of their technical acumen, culture or location, or 
the motives of the attacker, whether criminal or geopolitical” and a more passive protection where 
companies promise that they “will design, develop, and deliver products and services that prioritize 
security, privacy, integrity and reliability, and in turn reduce the likelihood, frequency, exploitability, and 
severity of vulnerabilities.” Id. 
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seemingly innocuous, this involves a considerable acquisition of prescriptive power 
by tech companies, which this Part analyzes and reviews. 
In 2017, Brad Smith, President and Chief Legal Officer of Microsoft, gave a 
provocative speech at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland.56 Smith’s talk 
started with an overview of the creation of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), the world’s most central and active humanitarian institution. Henry 
Dunant, a Swiss businessman, established the ICRC in 1863 after witnessing the 
horrors of war at the Battle of Solferino in June 1859, when thousands of soldiers 
lost their lives or were severely injured.57 While the atrocities of war were 
undoubtedly Dunant’s motivation in convincing governments to support the 
creation of the ICRC, according to Smith, it was also the new technologies of 
warfare that led Dunant and others to rethink the limits and the humanitarian 
aspects of waging war between nations.58 These new technologies directly caused 
massive atrocities, suffering, and casualties that convinced Dunant that an 
international humanitarian organization was urgently needed.59 
Smith argued that we are at a similar moment in history, where cyberspace is 
the catalyst for a new arms race.60 That arms race is leading to the creation of cyber 
weapons in an almost legally and ethically unrestricted manner, which leaves 
civilians vulnerable to severe harm and suffering. Smith, therefore, is of the view 
that he is in a similar position as Dunant, in that the tech industry, witnessing the 
horrors of global cyberattacks, should create its own version of an ICRC for 
cyberspace—a Cyber Red Cross (CRC) of sorts.  While Smith’s motivations may be 
genuine, this view represents a significant shift in the tech industry’s view of its own 
role in society. 
To demonstrate the humanitarian harms of cyberattacks, Smith provided the 
recent example of the WannaCry ransomware.61 In May 2017, the malware 
WannaCry affected as many as 200,000 computers in 150 nations around the 
 
56. Brad Smith Takes His Call for a Digital Geneva Convention to the United Nations, 
MICROSOFT (Nov. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Brad Smith Takes His Call], https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-
the-issues/2017/11/09/brad-smith-takes-call-digital-geneva-convention-united-nations/ [https:// 
perma.cc/5634-5JU2]. 
57. Henry Dunant (1828–1910),  INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS  (Apr. 6, 1998), https:// 
www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/57jnvq.htm [https://perma.cc/X9LR-X85S ]. 
58. Brad Smith Takes His Call, supra note 56. 
59. Brad Smith & Carol Ann Browne, What’s to Be Learned from the Founding of the Red Cross?, 
MICROSOFT, https://blogs.microsoft.com/today-in-tech/whats-to-be-learned-from-the-founding-of-
the-red-cross/ [https://perma.cc/K5AV-YDJW] (“Across Europe a consensus quickly emerged that 
these technological advances for warfare required new humanitarian and organizational innovations  
in response.”). 
60. Steve Ranger, Why Microsoft Is Fighting to Stop a Cyber World War, ZDNET (Dec. 12, 
2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/why-microsoft-is-fighting-to-stop-a-cyber-world-war/ 
[https://perma.cc/NAL5-EZB5] (“Smith drew a parallel between the run-up to the First World War 
and the burgeoning cyberwar arms race today.”). 
61. Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Hackers Hit Dozens of Countries Exploiting Stolen 
N.S.A. Tool, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uk-
national-health-service-cyberattack.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/P996-U7UE]. 
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world.62 This was not a military-to-military kind of cyberattack, but rather an 
indiscriminate ransomware worm that infected any computer it touched.63 Most 
notably, as many as 70,000 computers belonging to the United Kingdom’s National 
Health Service hospital network were severely affected.64 Smith’s concerns, shared 
with many others around the world, are that cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure 
could result in significant humanitarian consequences, and that the law is largely 
silent on the matter. 
Skeptics would argue that it was computers, not people, that were targeted and 
affected by the WannaCry ransomware. Therefore, what exactly is the humanitarian 
concern? This view could not be further from the truth. The adverse effects on 
medical computers and devices affected 7,000 patients scheduled to receive medical 
treatment on the day of WannaCry’s mayhem.65 Because computers have created 
mediated environments in which humans need computers to literally sustain life, 
attacks against computers will have clear and direct effects on human lives and  
well-being.66 Cyberattacks, therefore, may have serious consequences for civilians, 
who rely on governments, businesses, critical infrastructure, transport, energy, and 
other individuals who themselves rely on the integrity and availability of computer 
systems and networks.67 
Microsoft and many other tech companies clearly have a stake in promoting 
“peace” in cyberspace.68 No business would want the government to use its 
infrastructure to engage in cyber conflict, especially if such engagement did not 
directly benefit their revenue, could negatively affect user trust, and was not 
 
62. Elizabeth Piper, Cyber Attack Hits 200,000 in at Least 150 Countries: Europol, REUTERS 
(May 14, 2017, 3:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-europol/cyber-attack-hits-
200000-in-at-least-150-countries-europol-idUSKCN18A0FX [https://perma.cc/8THY-TSJ3 ]. 
63. Press Briefing, The White House, Press Briefing on the Attribution of the WannaCry 
Malware Attack to North Korea (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings- 
statements/press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-121917/ 
[https://perma.cc/V4TL-6KBF] (“In May of this year, a dangerous cyberattack known as WannaCry 
spread rapidly and indiscriminately across the world.”). 
64. Sarah Neville, NHS Systems to Be Strengthened After Cyber Attack, FIN. TIMES ( July 12, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ced6dd82-6709-11e7-9a66-93fb352ba1fe  [https://perma.cc/ 
YY6P-YGMV]. 
65. David Benady, Cybersecurity: Have Lessons Been Learned Since the WannaCry Attack?, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/delivering-digital-transformation/2018/
nov/29/cybersecurity-have-lessons-been-learned-since-the-wannacry-attack  [https://perma.cc/
YEW6-YWQ6] (“Over a third of trusts and nearly 600 doctors’ surgeries were hit by the virus, resulting 
in almost 7,000 patient appointments being cancelled.”). 
66. Tyler Elliot Bettilyon, Cybersecurity Is About Much More than Hacking, MEDIUM (Nov. 21, 
2018),  https://medium.com/s/story/cybersecurity-isnt-just-about-hacks-f11c7ad07660 [https:// 
perma.cc/X45F-CAES] (“Digital systems now play a crucial role in banking, payroll, distribution 
chains, voting, social interaction, medicine, cars, planes, trains, implanted medical devices, and so on. 
Each and every one of these digital systems is a potential vulnerability.”). 
67. Id. 
68. Ed Targett, Microsoft Demands “Digital Peace”—What Does It Really Want?, COMPUTER 
BUS. REV.  (Oct. 1, 2018),  https://www.cbronline.com/news/digital-peace-microsoft [https:// 
perma.cc/N8JE-AVAH]. 
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imposed coercively by regulators.69 And even if it did benefit the tech company’s 
profits, users’ trust would be severely impacted.70 Users are unlikely to approve of 
becoming pawns in conflicts between states, particularly if such conflicts are 
mediated by private tech companies. Tech companies themselves certainly do not 
want to perpetuate such a reality. Smith made this clear in his speech by highlighting 
how cyber warfare between nations is in fact an attack on civilians. He said, 
When there are attacks on cyberspace, they in fact are attacks on private 
property—it may be against the phone that is in your pocket, or the laptop 
that is on your desk, or the servers that are in our datacenter, or the cables 
that are underneath the ocean, that we operate, that connect datacenters 
together.71 
The concerns put forward by Smith illustrate the reason why many tech 
companies believe that their duty to their users involves strengthening their 
products’ cybersecurity—whether devices, software, or any other service on which 
civilians rely. By doing so, companies may make it harder for malicious actors to 
attack civilians, directly or indirectly, or at least increase the costs of such attacks to 
the point where malicious actors would become disincentivized from attacking 
civilians.72 Tech companies not only passively protect their users by repelling 
malware and patching their products, but are also currently using the law and courts 
to proactively defend them by going after malicious actors before users are 
massively victimized by cyberattacks.73 This is an example of the fairly  
well-established idea of a public-private partnership on certain national security and 
 
69. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 691 (2019) (“One 
possible explanation for the companies’ behavior is economic: the companies may assess that the 
posture of neutrality will best maximize their growth and profits going forward by increasing their 
appeal to users worldwide.”). 
70. See id. at 668, 683 (“They have global users, not just customers or shareholders . . . . [These] 
users rely on the company for services and trust the company to keep potentially sensitive information 
secure . . . . Unlike companies that merely sell goods to customers, the tech companies’ relationship to 
their users is more intimate, more expansive, and more constant than even a series of  
recurring transactions.”). 
71. Brad Smith Takes His Call, supra note 56. 
72. Daniel J. Solove, Cybersecurity: Leviathan vs. Low-Hanging Fruit, TEACH PRIVACY ( June 
24, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/cybersecurity-leviathan-vs-low-hanging-fruit [https://perma.cc/ 
B8ZF-AMMD] (“There are certainly many hackers with sophisticated technical skills and potent 
malicious technologies. These threats can seem akin to Leviathan—all powerful and insurmountable. 
It can be easy to get caught up focusing on the Leviathan and miss the low-hanging fruit of 
cybersecurity. This low-hanging fruit consists of rather simple and easy-to-fix vulnerabilities and bad 
practices. Cybersecurity is a garden of mostly low-hanging fruit. Pluck the fruit, and huge headway can 
be made in protecting data.”). 
73. Microsoft helps law enforcement authorities take down harmful botnets. See, e.g., Microsoft 
Teams Up with Law Enforcement and Other Partners to Disrupt Gamarue (Andromeda), MICROSOFT 
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/12/04/microsoft-teams-up-with-
law-enforcement-and-other-partners-to-disrupt-gamarue-andromeda/  [https://perma.cc/DL8F-
DNFM] (“Today, with help from Microsoft security researchers, law enforcement agencies around the 
globe, in cooperation with Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU), announced the disruption of 
Gamarue, a widely distributed malware that has been used in networks of infected computers 
collectively called the Andromeda botnet.”). 
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law enforcement issues.74 Smith, and surely other tech industry leaders, believe it is 
their responsibility to take these steps to protect their users. 
There may be another explanation for tech companies’ nascent role as 
legislators of global cybersecurity law: the desire for power. The current state of 
affairs in global cybersecurity law allows tech companies to perform such a role, 
since states are entirely unable to maintain their inherent authority in collectively 
regulating global cybersecurity, for reasons discussed below. But first, to fully 
understand how tech companies may become such legislators, it is important to 
review the current “legislative” steps that Microsoft and other companies have 
engaged in. 
A. Geneva 5.0 
The world needs a Digital Geneva Convention, says Brad Smith.75 There are 
simply too many cyberattacks targeting the private sector, and we need some kind 
of international legal framework that will commit actors to norms on  
cyberspace conduct.76 
The idea that the world needs a fifth Geneva Convention77 
—a Geneva 5.0—to address humanitarian concerns in cyberspace and protect 
civilians from cyberattacks during peacetime is somewhat misguided. After all, the 
Geneva Convention’s primary purpose is not only to protect civilians, but also to 
strike an acceptable balance between military necessity and humanitarian values.78 
As such, international humanitarian law authorizes the use of direct force against 
combatants and allows for collateral damage involving civilians and civilian property 
resulting from an attack, so long as that collateral damage is proportionate to the 
military advantage sought.79 This is a problematic vision from the humanitarian 
perspective, since it still confers a rather broad degree of discretion on warring 
states. In peacetime, the protection of civilians is the raison d’être of international 
 
74. Madeline Carr, Public-Private Partnership in National Cyber-Security Strategies, 92 INT’L  
AFF. 43 (2016). 
75. Smith, supra note 9. 
76. Id. 
77. The four current Geneva Conventions focus on (1) wounded and sick soldiers on land 
during war; (2) wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war; (3) rights of and 
obligations in respect to prisoners of war; and (4) protection of civilians, including in occupied territory. 
See The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS  
(Oct. 29, 2010),  https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm [https://perma.cc/UP2T-GXVQ]. 
78. Paul Weidenbaum, Necessity in International Law, 24 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 105, 
110 (1938) (“The Conventions expressly declare to strike a balance between military necessity and a 
humane conception of warfare.”). 
79. Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack,  INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS,  https://ihl-databases. 
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule14  [https://perma.cc/93F9-4RJ7 ] (“Launching an 
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”). 
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human rights law, which seeks to protect civilians from governmental overreach.80 
The same protections ought to apply online.81 Extending the rules and norms of 
wartime international humanitarian law to the peacetime use of cyberattacks is a 
dangerous move.82 It would mean that some peacetime cyberattacks, when directed 
at military objectives, would be legal. It would also harm civilians in “indirect” ways, 
which international humanitarian law largely tolerates. 
However, the idea the we may need a new Digital Geneva Convention 
generates some important and difficult questions with regard to the protection of 
civilians in cyberspace during armed conflict.83 First and foremost, what is it about 
international humanitarian law at present that renders it ineffectual? Specifically, 
why is it that the tech industry, with Microsoft in the lead, decided that this ought 
to be their newest conquest? 
As alluded to earlier, there are simply too many questions on how this law 
applies in different situations in cyberspace. One could argue that there are certain 
gaps in the law that leave civilians vulnerable to certain kinds of cyberattacks that 
produce negative effects for individuals and society at large.84 The reason for that 
could be that either custom involving international humanitarian law or its accepted 
interpretation has not yet caught up with emerging offensive uses of cyberspace in 
 
80. In the cybersecurity context, the question would be whether a foreign government 
mounting a cyberattack against another nation would satisfy the effective control standard required by 
international human rights law to determine its obligations vis-à-vis a foreign government’s citizens. See 
Oona Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply 
Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389, 395 (2011) (“Nearly every other foreign and international body 
examined here concludes that countries that exert ‘effective control’ over a territory, person, or situation 
must observe basic human rights obligations.”). 
81. H.R.C. Res. 32/13, supra note 36, ¶ 1 (“[T]he same rights that people have offline must also 
be protected online.”). 
82. Francesca Casalini & Stefania Di Stefano, State Behaviour in Cyberspace: Moving Away from 
a Military Discourse, DIPLO (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/state-behaviour-
cyberspace-moving-away-military-discourse [https://perma.cc/5YS5-EY8S] (“Since it remains unclear 
when a cyber-operation attains the level of armed attack for the purposes of IHL, and since the aims 
pursued by Microsoft’s proposal are largely different from those pursued by the laws of war, it would 
seem more appropriate to re-think the Microsoft proposal as an instrument that would seek to establish 
a system of Internet governance, and that does not aim at affecting or replacing any other existing legal 
regime. It could simply represent the acknowledgment that there are new phenomena that are in need 
of regulation. In this sense, the ‘peacetime’ qualification does not add value, and generates a risk that 
the proposed rules would be considered displaceable in times of war, whereas the particular relationship 
that exists between the state and the private sector in the cyber realm would persist even during an 
armed conflict. For these reasons, we suggest removing the peacetime qualification altogether.”). 
83. Tarah Wheeler, In Cyberwar, There Are No Rules, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/in-cyberwar-there-are-no-rules-cybersecurity-war-defense/ 
[https://perma.cc/P4JM-VURL] (providing an account of how the lack of rules may evolve into a  
full-scale cyberwar). 
84. Paul Nicholas, Filling the Gaps in International Law Is Essential to Making Cyberspace a 
Safer Place, MICROSOFT (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/27/ 
filling-the-gaps-in-international-law-is-essential-to-making-cyberspace-a-safer-place/  [https:// 
perma.cc/UH92-9SE3]. 
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armed conflict, which could result in lethal and nonlethal but dangerous harms.85 
As a result, there may be some considerable definitional and normative gaps that 
need to be addressed if we wish to maintain an adequate level of protection for 
civilians. For example, for an action to be an “attack,” must it cause death, or would 
any other effects qualify?86 Is civilian data an “object” protected from direct 
“attack”? How are nonlethal effects calculated in comparison to lethal effects  
in cyberspace? 
Second, extending the law governing war to peacetime seems directly 
antithetical. That law, after all, is more permissive when it comes to civilian 
casualties and damage to their property, as wars often involve a certain degree of 
suffering or, in legalese, proportionate collateral civilian damage that is permissible 
under international humanitarian law.87 Why does Geneva 5.0 make this dangerous 
leap? A simple explanation would be that this is a common conflation between 
humanitarian and human rights law, both striking their own balances and pursuing 
different values and policy goals. While human rights law has a role to play in both 
peacetime and wartime,88 humanitarian law only applies in an armed conflict.89 
But there may be a more complicated and less intuitive explanation, which 
stems from the nature of cyberattacks. That explanation has to do with the  
ever-blurring dividing line between war and peace.90 The argument goes that 
international humanitarian law applies only during armed conflict.91 Over the 
decades, however, conflicts have become more complex, involving non-state actors 
such as terrorist organizations and private militias. Some weapons, such as 
 
85. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Cyberwar & International Law Step Zero, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 355, 
374 (2015) (“[C]yber weapons create the possibility of actions that cause severe harm to the victim, but 
nevertheless do not result in physical damage or injury to persons. The paradigmatic example is an 
attack that wipes out information stored on a system or network, such as a stock exchange.”). 
86. Kilovaty, supra note 47, at 127 (“The key to incorporate disruptive cyber operations within 
the scope of ‘attack’ under IHL is to interpret ‘acts of violence’ as including cyber operations with 
disruptive effects.”); cf. Pete Pascucci & Kurt Sanger, Why a Broad Definition of “Violence” in Cyber 
Conflict Is Unwise and Legally Unsound, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
38536/broad-definition-violence-cyber-conflict-unwise-legally-unsound/ [https://perma.cc/ 
WH2L-BK78]. 
87. Stephen Petkis, Rethinking Proportionality in the Cyber Context, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1431, 
1440 (2016) (“According to this jus in bello conception of proportionality, a state must balance the 
‘concrete and direct’ military advantage it is likely to obtain against any incidental harm its actions are 
likely to cause civilians.”). 
88. Oona Hathaway et al., Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Between 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1883 (2012) (offering three 
models to explain the role and applicability of international human rights law in armed conflict). 
89. Id. at 1888 (“Humanitarian law applies only in situations of armed conflict; hence the 
applicability of this body of law turns on whether an armed conflict or occupation exists.”). 
90. See, e.g., ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME 
EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016); Rosa Brooks, There’s No Such Thing as Peacetime, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 13, 2015, 5:47 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/theres-no-such-
thing-as-peacetime-forever-war-terror-civil-liberties/ [https://perma.cc/7WQ2-RBTK]. 
91. See Hathaway et al., supra note 88, at 1888. 
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cyberattacks, have become “democratized”92 (accessible to non-state actors) and 
wield more disruptive than destructive power (though they can certainly be 
destructive). Therefore, their effects are not reaching the level of intensity usually 
associated with a traditional armed conflict, but it does not entirely feel like 
peacetime either.93 It is an intermediate category, somewhere in between the two 
extremes of war and peace, that the law has failed to recognize and regulate.94 
Rosa Brooks has long argued that we are overly obsessed with antiquated 
distinctions between wartime and peacetime.95 This is a critical conversation to have 
with regard to cyber weapons, as they can cause massive disruption, potentially 
leading to humanitarian crises, but are rarely directly lethal. This is where the 
comfortable analogy between cyber and non-cyber weapons is not as obvious.96 
This leads to a seemingly simple question, though the answer may not be easy at  
all: What would be considered “cyber peace” and at what point does the use of 
cyber weapons reach the threshold of “cyber war”? How do we distinguish the 
regulation of cyber war from regular war, and is such a distinction even required? 
The question is further exacerbated by Microsoft’s recent petition on “Digital 
Peace,” in which “digital citizens” are demanding digital peace.97 What does that 
mean, and who gets to answer that question?98 
Third, it is important to acknowledge the identity and interests guiding the 
actors engaged in privatizing cybersecurity law. After all, international humanitarian 
 
92. Grigsby, supra note 53, at 109 (“The online world is one of strategic instability, given the 
relative ease and stealth of state-sponsored attacks, and the fact that it is almost impossible to tell 
whether a purely defensive cyber action is in fact hostile.”). 
93. Michael Schmitt, Five Myths in the Debate About Cyber War, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 23, 
2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/918/myths-debate-cyber-war/ [https://perma.cc/6CL9-Q5BW] 
(explaining that a non-international armed conflict involving only cyberattack would have two  
features: “First, the intensity criterion would require protracted cyberattacks causing extensive physical 
damage or death. Second, the organization criterion would generally exclude operations, no matter how 
severe, conducted by groups organized entirely online”). 
94. Alexander Greenawalt, If War Is Everywhere, Then Must the Law Be Nowhere?, 32  
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 25 (2018) (explaining that the distinction between war and peace is essential 
for determining whether killing is justified or not). 
95. Rosa Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict 
in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 677 (2004) (“These binary distinctions [between war and 
peace] are no longer tenable. In almost every sphere, globalization has complicated once straightforward 
legal categories, but this is nowhere more apparent and more troubling than in the realms of armed 
conflict and national security law. Although the boundaries between ‘war’ and ‘nonwar,’ and between 
‘national security’ and ‘domestic issues,’ have been eroding for some time, September 11 and its 
aftermath have highlighted the increasing incoherence and irrelevance of these traditional  
legal categories.”). 
96. Eichensehr, supra note 85, at 374. 
97. Demand Digital Peace Now, supra note 23. 
98. As one commentator observed: “The DGC [Digital Geneva Convention] picks and chooses 
International Humanitarian Law principles and taglines at its convenience, without fully developing the 
concepts.” Raquel Vázquez Llorente, A Digital Geneva Convention? The Role of the Private Sector in 
Cybersecurity, LSE IDEAS STRATEGIC UPDATE, May 2018, at 10, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/ 
Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-The-Role-of-the-Private-Sector-in-Cybersecurity.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/MSU4-3VFA]. 
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law was created by states and, mostly, for the benefit of states.99 Why did the tech 
industry suddenly decide to take up the reins of protecting civilians in cyberspace? 
This desire for power in a space plagued with normative ambiguities may lead to 
some serious issues with respect to the absence of certain values such as 
transparency and accountability. 
In many instances, these tech companies advocate for forming the 
aforementioned CRC, or “Cyber-ICRC.”100 But whereas the ICRC is a neutral 
organization that is not motivated by profits or capitalist power and is governed by 
clear rules, norms, and values, with the consent of state parties to the Geneva 
Conventions, that is not necessarily the case for the CRC. The CRC would involve 
tech companies in an unprecedented fashion, further enhancing their power and 
standing in the global community. From a normative-content perspective, Geneva 
5.0 is far from the only prescription promoted by tech companies. The 
Cybersecurity Tech Accord, a set of rules that seventy global tech companies 
committed themselves to, is perhaps the most significant development with respect 
to the privatization of cybersecurity law.101 
B. The Cybersecurity Tech Accord 
To strengthen their commitment to their users, a group of global tech 
companies has signed the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, a public commitment to 
“protect and empower our users and customers, and thereby to improve the 
security, stability, and resilience of cyberspace.”102 Microsoft initiated this process 
in the spring of 2018, with over sixty global tech companies signing on the Accord’s 
principles.103 Underlying this Accord is the understanding that cyberspace has 
become the cornerstone of global society. Global society relies on the Internet for 
communication, business, entertainment, infrastructure, education, and much more. 
But such reliance creates fertile ground for criminal and state-sponsored offensive 
activity, which undermines the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the data, 
services, and applications used throughout cyberspace.104 
 
99. Eichensehr, supra note 85, at 366 (“[I]nternational law has traditionally operated at the level 
of sovereign States, and the independence of sovereigns engendered a strong tradition that States are 
bound only by international law to which they consent.”). 
100. Elaine Korzak & Herb Lin, Proposal for a Cyber-International Committee of the Red Cross, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 17, 2018, 8:25 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/proposal-cyber-international-
committee-red-cross [https://perma.cc/B6H8-FHUT]. 
101. A Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace, supra note 54. 
102. Id. 
103. Rob Wright, Cybersecurity Tech Accord Expands with New Members, Partners, 
TECHTARGET (Sept. 25, 2018),  https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/252449304/ 
Cybersecurity-Tech-Accord-expands-with-new-members-partners [https://perma.cc/2UHE-8RNX] 
(“The Cybersecurity Tech Accord was first unveiled by Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, during his 
keynote at RSA Conference 2018.”). 
104. Isabella Uria, Hacking the Election Conference (Write Up), YALE L. SCH. (Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/isp/documents/hacking_the_election_ 
conference_report_11.01.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSG7-CWMR] (quoting Professor Jack Goldsmith 
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The Cybersecurity Tech Accord contains merely four principles.105 First, tech 
companies pledge to protect their users from cyberattacks by providing products 
and services with built-in security and privacy.106 Second, tech companies will not 
provide assistance to governments or any other organization in the launch of 
cyberattacks.107 Third, tech companies will educate users on tools available to them, 
and will support civil society, governmental, and organizational efforts in advancing 
global cybersecurity.108 And, fourth, tech companies will create formal and informal 
partnerships to enhance cybersecurity—sharing information on threats, patching 
vulnerabilities, and encouraging global information-sharing to protect civilians and 
help in recovery efforts from cyberattacks.109 
It would make sense for major tech companies to commit to these principles. 
Aside from being a positive public relations step, it is also a reliable and practical 
commitment, since these tech companies happen to control significant portions of 
the infrastructure, products, and services that populate cyberspace. Therefore, they 
believe that they ought to be the “first responders” in cyberspace.110 These 
principles thus appear at first glance to be a positive development in protecting 
civilians from harmful cyber activity. But that value judgement only holds if we 
detach these principles from the tech economy and its motivations, which raises a 
variety of as-yet unanswered questions.111 For example, what is the role of tech 
companies in enforcing and interpreting these principles? 
C. A Cyber Red Cross 
The idea of creating an organization whose expertise it is to resolve 
humanitarian crises in cyberspace has been promoted by several scholars for 
years.112 Duncan Hollis and Tim Maurer, following a series of serious cybersecurity 
incidents, including against Sony, Target, Home Depot, and J.P. Morgan Chase, 
argued in 2015 that “the time is ripe for a bolder approach to cybersecurity . . . 
cyberspace could use a global cyber federation, a federation of non-governmental 
 
as observing that “‘the United States has the most robust cyber capability in the world, but it is also the 
most vulnerable,’ due to its extensive dependence on computer systems in the public, private, and 
military sectors”). 
105. A Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace, supra note 54. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. See Lousie Hurel & Luisa Lobato, Unpacking Cyber Norms: Private Companies as Norm 
Entrepreneurs, 3 J. CYBER POL’Y 61, 63 (2018). 
111. Andrew Keane Woods, Tech Firms Are Not Sovereigns, in HOOVER INST. AEGIS PAPER 
SERIES 3 (Sept. 27, 2018),  https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/ 
woods_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/4548-C744 ] (answering the question of what tech 
companies are up to: “making money”). 
112. Duncan Hollis & Tim Maurer, A Red Cross for Cyberspace, TIME (Feb. 18, 2015, 10:04 
AM), https://time.com/3713226/red-cross-cyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/GBW9-9Y8F]. 
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institutions similar to the role of the Red Cross . . . .”113 Hollis and Maurer’s vision 
is to make Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) throughout the world 
the building blocks of this new “independent, neutral, and impartial” institution.114 
Their proposal involves neither for-profit private actors or state actors within the 
structure of this new institution. 
It took three years for that proposal to be reexamined and reintroduced in a 
modified form. Herb Lin and Elaine Korzak have advocated for the creation of a 
“Cyber-International Committee of the Red Cross.”115 Lin and Korzak’s 
reexamination was triggered by the creation of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, 
discussed above. They believe its principles will only be effectuated if there is an 
institution to back them up. 
The CyberPeace Institute, established in late 2019, is an example of such 
emerging CRC organization.116 The CyberPeace Institute involves both for-profit 
and non-profit entities within an organization  that seeks to protect civilians from 
cyber-attacks, assist in accountability, and advance international law norms for 
responsible behavior in cyberspace.117 While it is too early to pass judgement on the 
CyberPeace Institute’s mandate, there are some challenging issues that may require 
further attention in the years to come.  
Some of these issues include whether the CyberPeace Institute will commit to 
principles of transparency, independence from corporate capture, neutrality  
vis-à-vis state governments, and accountability. While the CyberPeace Institute 
claims to be guided by these principles, it remains to be seen whether they can be 
upheld in practice. Of particular challenge are scenarios where: (1) certain tech 
corporations make profit off data collected and analyzed by the CyberPeace 
Institute; (2) the victim of a cyber-attack requesting assistance is a politically 
controversial organization (terrorist group, for example), forcing the Institute to 
decide whether to offer assistance or not; (3) there is a conflict between international 
law and norms created and practiced by the Institute; (4) there is a conflict between 
the mandate of existing institutions (ICRC, for example) and the Institute. 
In the years to come, the CyberPeace Institute (and any other CRC) may face 
pushback from governments. For example, some governments may be concerned 
that their views are not fairly represented, that the investigative powers and expertise 
of the Institute may somehow prejudice their national security, or that their ability 
to create norms for cyberspace is preempted by the Institute’s mandate. As always, 
some of these objections may be more reasonable than others.  
These challenges notwithstanding, the idea of a CRC as a global institution 
seeking to promote stability and trust in cyberspace appears desirable. At the same 
 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Korzak & Lin, supra note 100. 
 116.  See CyberPeace Institute, About Us, https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/K6PH-A9Y8] ( last visited May 26, 2020). 
 117.  Id. 
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time, it requires further unpacking. The debate on whether the world needs a CRC 
could be a debate over whether there is a need for: (1) a humanitarian assistance 
organization; (2) an independent institution for the investigation and attribution of 
cyberattacks; (3) a reliable cybersecurity expertise institution; (4) an institution 
creating and promoting norms for an ever-evolving cyberspace threat landscape; or 
(5) a neutral and apolitical institution performing an entirely professional function 
for global cybersecurity. More than anything, if tech companies become involved in 
a CRC scheme, it would essentially mean that they will possess insurmountable and 
unprecedented power in global cybersecurity governance. To illustrate that, I 
discuss these five concepts in turn. 
1. Humanitarian Assistance 
Say there is a cyberattack against critical infrastructure targets, such as the 
power grid, the Internet’s backbone, or the healthcare sector, causing a serious 
humanitarian crisis. Which global institution has the capacity to effectively address 
such a crisis? The immediate association that comes to mind is the ICRC. The ICRC 
has indeed been at the forefront of humanitarian assistance, alleviating suffering, 
mitigating atrocities, and assisting in holding accountable those responsible. Indeed, 
the ICRC might be helpful for responding to some aspects of cyber-humanitarian 
crises. But could the ICRC assist in restoring affected computer systems and 
networks? Could it provide assistance to ensure that such a humanitarian disaster 
does not reoccur? 
The CRC, therefore, would be the ICRC equivalent for humanitarian crises in 
cyberspace. It would assist in restoring affected targets, advise on best measures, 
and fill the gap where states are unwilling or unable to assist their own victimized 
subjects. This notion of humanitarian assistance is closely related to other functions 
often mentioned with regard to a CRC. For example, it could assist in investigation 
and attribution where victims cannot get their state’s government to do so, whether 
because the state does not have the capacity or is unwilling. As Lin and Korzak 
argue, the CRC will “fill an assistance gap that is particularly felt by victims who 
lack the capacity or resources to respond to or recover from cyberattacks.”118 
2. Investigation and Attribution 
Attribution, “the ability to confidently say who did it: which country, 
government agency, group, or even individual is responsible for a cyber intrusion 
or attack”119 is key in assigning international responsibility. But because attackers 
 
118. Id. 
119. John Carlin, Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-of-Government Approach to National Security 
Cyber Threats, 7 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 391, 396 (2016). 
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may leverage and benefit from anonymity,120 attribution is often seen as one of the 
major challenges of global cybersecurity.121 
Investigation and attribution—done neutrally, independently, professionally, 
and promptly—are critical functions in cyberspace that are currently institutionally 
absent from the structure of the global community.122 Currently, if an entity (other 
than the government itself) becomes the victim of a cyberattack, that victim can 
only ask for assistance from its local law enforcement or, more broadly, the state. 
However, decisions on whether to investigate, how to proceed with an investigation, 
and who the culprit is are often affected by a series of political and strategic 
interests.123 For example, will the victim’s state blame a powerful nation for 
initiating a cyberattack if there are major economic interests involved with that 
nation? Should the state reveal its evidence at the expense of compromising its 
means and methods? And most importantly, what is the threshold above which 
attribution should be deemed certain? 
A CRC, among other things, would provide this neutral and independent 
function of investigating and attributing cyberattacks without having to consider the 
myriad political and strategic interests that states are often prone to. The CRC would 
have to possess cutting-edge cybersecurity expertise, constantly improving its means 
and methods, to ensure that attribution is accurate and that attackers do not 
outsmart it and compromise its investigation and attribution functions. 
3. Cybersecurity Expertise 
To ensure that the global community maintained its trust in the CRC, the CRC 
would have to constantly be on the forefront of cybersecurity knowledge and 
practice. Cybersecurity offense-defense is often analogized to a cat-and-mouse 
game, where attackers constantly improve their techniques to overcome defensive 
 
120. Id. at 409 (“[A]ttributing activity on the Internet is challenging. Hackers often route their 
malicious traffic through third-party proxies they either rent or compromise. An attacker in Eastern 
Europe that uses a botnet of compromised computers in the Middle East to conduct a DDoS attack 
against a U.S. target creates a false narrative that actors located in the Middle East were responsible for 
that act. Even attributing an attack to the actual originating computer may be insufficient; we may know 
the machine used to execute a hack, but not the person or group that controlled it. Thus, technical 
investigation must often be supplemented by credible human intelligence. And all of this must be done 
quickly and consistently; attribution is of little use if it takes years and only identifies a small fraction  
of attackers.”). 
121. Christopher Rosana Nyabuto, A Game of Code: Challenges of Cyberspace as a Domain of 
Warfare, 3 STRATHMORE L. REV. 49, 51 (2018). 
122. However, the RAND Corporation previously proposed a global attribution agency 
modeled on the International Atomic Energy Agency following Microsoft’s mention of the idea. See 
Milton Mueller, A Global Cyber-Attribution Organization—Thinking It Through, INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT ( June 4, 2017), https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/06/04/a-global-
cyber-attribution-org/ [https://perma.cc/SW8Y-8HQK]. 
123. See Marcus Schulzke, The Politics of Attributing Blame for Cyberattacks and the Costs of 
Uncertainty, 16 PERSP. POL. 954 (2018). 
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barriers created by defenders.124 Defenders need to defend against all possible 
attacks and attackers,125 while attackers only need to succeed once.126 
Proposals for a CRC often highlight that such an institution would possess 
cybersecurity expertise on a global scale, a one-stop shop of sorts, which would 
allow states and other actors to benefit from its expertise. This expertise would 
exceed mere investigative and attribution assistance, focusing additionally on 
preventive (defensive) cybersecurity. 
4. Global Norm-Creation 
Next, the CRC might be able to fill in an important gap in creating global 
cybersecurity norms. Deep geopolitical differences between states impede the ability 
of international law to develop effective standards and rules for global cybersecurity. 
The CRC might be able to remedy this situation by developing norms and best 
practices that would not be influenced by geopolitical differences and unsatisfactory 
compromise. Rather, they would reflect the consensus of the world’s professional 
information security community. Clearly, states set certain thresholds through 
treaties and customary international law—such as the existence of an armed attack 
or armed conflict—but the CRC could still be relevant in its ability to provide 
neutral standards and rules applicable in all situations, with the goal of improving 
information security. 
5. Global Apolitical Authority 
Perhaps more symbolically, the CRC will be a professional institution that is 
not subordinated to any state’s government. This may enhance its global credibility 
and discourage actors from contesting its findings. However, there may need to be 
a mechanism in place to resolve any factual or legal disputes arising from  
CRC’s activity. 
6. The Cyber Red Cross’s Utility 
The idea of a CRC is a good one, but it needs to be done right. Currently, tech 
companies are seeking a central role in such institution, which could raise a host of 
 
124. Colin Barker, Hackers and Defenders Continue Cybersecurity Game of Cat and Mouse, 
ZDNET (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.zdnet.com/article/hackers-and-defenders-continue-cyber-
security-game-of-cat-and-mouse/ [https://perma.cc/T65F-3ZZR] (“The cyber arms race between 
hackers and the defenders of corporate networks continues apace.”). 
125. WILLIS H. WARE, SECURITY CONTROLS FOR COMPUTER SYSTEMS: REPORT OF 
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON COMPUTER SECURITY (RAND Corp. reissued 1979), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R609-1.html, [https://perma.cc/43WW-9CQ7] (“The system 
designer must be aware of the points of vulnerability, which may be thought of as leakage points, and 
he must provide adequate mechanisms to counteract both accidental and deliberate events. The specific 
leakage points . . . [include] physical surroundings, hardware, software, communication links, and 
organizational (personnel and procedures).”). 
126. JOSEPH NYE, THE FUTURE OF POWER 125 (2011) (“Because the internet was designed 
for ease of use rather than security, the offense currently has the advantage over the defense.”). 
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concerns, discussed in Part III below. The objection to the idea of a new institution 
for humanitarian cyberspace matters is not so much with the institution itself, but 
rather with the involvement of private tech companies in matters that pertain to 
human rights and war. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DISRUPTION 
There are many international legal questions that tech companies on their own 
cannot practically solve,127 nor do they have the democratic legitimacy and 
transparency required to do so. 128 However, tech companies are still beginning to 
engage in creating international norms and rules to address security issues arising in 
cyberspace. On top of that, their relative degree of uncontested success in creating 
such norms and rules is due to states’ inability to bridge geopolitical divides, making 
it unlikely that states will reach a consensus on how to regulate cybersecurity globally 
in the near future.129 Tech companies have decided to take on that role. 
International law, at least traditionally, involves norms and rules created by 
states, either through their explicit consent in treaties or through custom developed 
through the years which states consider to be legally binding.130 Formally speaking, 
the three authoritative instruments that make up international law are treaties, 
custom, and general principles.131 Judicial decisions (such as the International Court 
of Justice’s) and legal scholarship reflect subsidiary sources for determining the rules 
of international law.132 
Currently, there is no universal treaty on how cybersecurity relates to 
civilians,133 nor is there a prevailing and long-standing custom that could inform 
states of the best practices and red lines applicable to their offensive and defensive 
 
127. Pamela Lian, ‘Digital Geneva Convention’? What’s Next for Internet Governance Challenges? , 
ITU NEWS (Nov. 13, 2017), https://news.itu.int/digital-geneva-convention-whats-next-for-internet-
governance-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/9J7J-VCGZ] (“Neither national governments, nor the 
technology sector, nor civil society, nor anyone else can alone solve the challenges of  
technological progress.”). 
128. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY  
TECH. L.J. 1051, 1084 (2017) (“[T]he major antitrust concerns surround the control of data by a small 
number of concentrated companies and the lack of transparency about their collection and usage.”); see 
also Jacob Kasternakes, FCC Chairman Says Twitter, Facebook, Google May Need Transparency Law, 
VERGE (Sept. 4, 2018, 2:20 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/4/17819418/fcc-chairman-web-
company-transparency-regulation-pai [https://perma.cc/JDW6-VYB8] (“The leader of the Federal 
Communications Commission says that major web companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google have 
offered little transparency into how they work—and it’s time to seriously consider forcing them to  
tell us.”). 
129. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 2. 
130. Brown & Poellet, supra note 44, at 126 (“The body of international law is a jumble of 
historic practice and tradition as well as signed agreements between nations.”). 
131. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
132. Id. art. 38(1)(d). 
133. See Ido Kilovaty & Itamar Mann, Towards a Cyber-Security Treaty, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 3, 
2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/32268/cyber-security-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/P8KT-6ZWS] 
(arguing that a cyber-specific treaty is needed to protect civilians and institutions). 
First to Printer_Kilovaty.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/20  8:13 PM 
1204 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1181 
use of cyberspace.134 There seems to be a major geopolitically- and  
ideologically-based disagreement among states as to what these practices and red 
lines should be, particularly between the states that are principally involved in 
cyberspace and thus benefitting from its use: the United States, United Kingdom, 
Russia, China, Israel, and Iran, to name a few.135 
It therefore comes as no surprise that corporations have taken charge in 
arguing for an amendment to and reevaluation of existing international law norms 
and rules that fail to provide reasonable protections for civilians in cyberspace. 
Microsoft’s attempts to promote a Digital Geneva Convention that would extend 
to peacetime the protections afforded to civilians during wartime is one example of 
such involvement. 
This Part looks at states’ current international endeavors to develop 
frameworks for regulating global cybersecurity. As this Article has argued, these 
attempts have largely failed. As a consequence, private tech companies are taking 
over. This Part looks at what exactly these norms are and how they may end up 
regulating international relations in the cybersecurity context. Finally, it looks at 
whether these developments represent a normative crisis. 
A. International Legal Failure 
Why does international law fail to regulate state conduct in cyberspace? There 
may be many compelling answers to this question. Perhaps there is disagreement 
over how some legal terms of art apply in cyberspace. For example, what is an 
“attack”136 or a “use of force” in cyberspace?137 There is certainly some practical 
difficulty in attempting to apply territorial concepts to an aterritorial space.138 The 
 
134. Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on 
Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 595 (2018) (arguing not only that 
there isn’t any current state practice on the matter, but that it is unlikely one will evolve anytime  
soon: “The lack of transparency in the field—underreporting of cyberoperations and limited attribution 
claims—makes it difficult to identify relevant state practice”). 
135. Sintia Radu, China, Russia Biggest Cyber Offenders, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2019, 5:30 
PM),  https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-02-01/china-and-russia-biggest-
cyber-offenders-since-2006-report-shows [https://perma.cc/EF9U-2SB4] (citing a report studying the 
most active countries in cyber offense, which “examined data on China, North Korea, Iran, India, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Ukraine, Israel 
and France”). 
136. Protocol I, supra note 41, at art. 49(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 36 (defining “attacks” as “acts of 
violence against the adversary, whether in offense or in defense”). For a thorough discussion and 
analysis of which offensive uses of cyberspace constitute an “attack” and how an “attack” ought to 
adapt to the realities of cyber offense, see Kilovaty, supra note 47. 
137. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4); see also Kim Zetter, Legal Experts: Stuxnet Attack on Iran Was 
Illegal ‘Act of Force’, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2013, 12:53 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/stuxnet-
act-of-force/ [https://perma.cc/E9QG-F5CC] (arguing that the Stuxnet worm unleashed against the 
Iranian nuclear program may have violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibiting the use of force). 
See generally Matthew Waxman, Cyber Attacks as “Force” Under UN Charter Article 2(4), 87 INT’L  
L. STUD. 43 (2011). 
138. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 379 (2015) 
(observing that data is “unterritorial”). 
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issue may also be about boundary-setting. We know that international law protects 
state sovereignty, but how far does that sovereignty extend in cyberspace?139 Also, 
international humanitarian law allows a certain degree of collateral damage to 
civilians and civilian objects. But does damage to data fall within the scope of 
“civilian objects”?140 Or, perhaps the reason is far more grounded in realism than 
anyone can imagine, with states seeking to keep their power to clandestinely and 
effectively engage in state-to-state offensive activity in cyberspace.141 In this context, 
cyberspace would be a legal terra incognita, where the legal aspects of state activity in 
cyberspace is not only unexplored but also undesirable from the states’ points  
of view.142 
Indeed, the work of Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany suggests that states, 
particularly those significantly engaged in cyberspace, are reluctant to accept legally 
binding rules for their conduct because they have “a limited interest in promoting 
legal certainty regarding the regulation of cyberspace.”143 This suggests that there is 
nothing structurally flawed with the law, but rather the challenge is with states who 
wish to retain their authority and power by resisting the infusion of cyberspace with 
legal standards and rules. It therefore comes as no surprise that tech companies are 
taking over a role that the international community is unable to perform. 
Kubo Macak’s work on the crisis of international law and cybersecurity is 
equally alarming.144 Macak identifies three trends that together support his assertion 
that international law has not only failed to regulate cybersecurity, but also that we 
are in an actual crisis.145 First, there are no attempts to codify the rules applicable to 
global cybersecurity in a binding treaty.146 Second, states are reluctant to develop 
binding customary international law.147 And, third, whatever multilateral processes 
 
139. Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 
207, 210 (2017) (“The principle of sovereignty is universal, but its application to the unique 
particularities of the cyberspace domain remains for states to determine through state practice and/or 
the development of treaty rules.”). 
140. See, e.g., Heather Harisson Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the 
Challenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 ISR. L. REV. 39, 45 (2015) (arguing that data should 
be recognized as object to better protect civilians); Kubo Mac a k, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for 
Interpretive Computer Data as Objects Under International Humanitarian Law, 48 ISR. L. REV. 55, 55 
(2015) (arguing that data ought to be an ‘object’); Michael Schmitt, The Notion of ‘Objects’ During Cyber 
Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 ISR. L. REV. 81, 84 (2015) 
(arguing that data should not be characterized as an object in itself). 
141. Dan Efrony, Is It Time to Regulate Cyber Conflicts?, LAWFARE (May 4, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/it-time-regulate-cyber-conflicts  [https://perma.cc/6N4N-QW7D] 
(“The legal and political ambiguity coupled with the power to act covertly benefits the most 
technologically capable nations in cyberspace, and those nations won’t voluntarily give away their newly 
acquired strategic superiority.”). 
142. Id. 
143. Efrony & Shany, supra note 134, at 585. 
144. Kubo Mac a k, Is the International Law of Cyber Security in Crisis?, 8 INT’L CONF. CYBER 
CONFLICT 127 (2016). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 129–30. 
147. Id. at 130. 
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still take place, their focus tends to be on nonbinding norms.148 What follows is a 
review of some of the most prominent processes and efforts to establish the 
international rules for global cybersecurity. 
1. U.N. Group of Governmental Experts 
The United Nations’ Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was an effort 
to create and clarify rules of conduct in cyberspace. The U.N. GGE was established 
in 1999 to consider “Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.”149 The GGEs 
consisted of fifteen to twenty representatives of member states who would examine 
an issue and report back to the General Assembly if they were able to come to a 
consensus agreement on a report. Three of these GGEs were successful in 
producing such reports, in 2010, 2013, and 2015. 
The project gained the favor of the G-7,150 G-20,151 and the OECD,152 and 
appeared to be on the right track to achieve something truly revolutionary153: a 
comprehensive set of rules clarifying and constraining transnational state behavior 
in cyberspace. The apex of this endeavor was in 2015, when the GGE released a 
report containing a series of rules that was seemingly uncontroversial, representing 
what appeared to be a strong consensus.154 For example, the report suggested that 
a state should “not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its 
obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure 
or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide 
services to the public.”155 Even though GGE Reports rules are voluntary and 
nonbinding, states did not accept these recommendations and the project collapsed 
 
148. Id. at 131. 
149. G.A. Res. 53/70, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in 
the Context of International Security ( Jan. 4, 1999) (“Calls upon Member States to promote at 
multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of  
information security.”). 
150. The Year in Review: The Death of the UN GGE Process?, COUNCIL FOREIGN  
REL. (Dec. 21, 2017),  https://www.cfr.org/blog/year-review-death-un-gge-process  [https:// 
perma.cc/MW4J-EJCY]. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. See Joseph Marks, U.N. Body Agrees to U.S. Norms in Cyberspace, POLITICO ( July 9, 2015, 
12:44 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/un-body-agrees-to-us-norms-in-cyberspace-
119900 [https://perma.cc/9BRD-KMW2] (“It’s a breakthrough for U.S. diplomats, who have been 
pushing these ‘norms’ as an alternative to formal treaties as a way to help tame the lawless frontier  
of cyberspace.”). 
154. Elaine Korzak, The 2015 GGE Report: What Next for Norms in Cyberspace?, LAWFARE 
(Sept. 23, 2015, 8:32 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2015-gge-report-what-next-norms-
cyberspace [https://perma.cc/VWA9-FB35]. 
155. Rep. of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. and  
Telecomms. in the Context of Int’l Sec., transmitted by letter dated 26 June 2015 from the Chair of the 
Grp., U.N. Doc. A/70/174, at 8 ( July 22, 2015). 
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entirely at the GGE’s last session in June 2017.156 As one commentator put it, “a 
nearly seven-year process to write the rules that should guide state activity in 
cyberspace came to a halt.”157 Many attribute this failure to inevitable geopolitical 
differences between the United States, Russia, and China.158 This divide is rooted in 
two different disagreements: whether the use of cyber operations should be allowed 
at all159 (regulation vs. a complete ban) and which activities constitute cyber conflict 
to begin with.160 
This failure at the U.N.—the most international forum for states to negotiate 
new regimes—created a normative vacuum that is likely to be usurped by other, 
nongovernmental stakeholders: tech companies. Tech companies realize that states 
were, are, and will be unable to reach a consensus, and that the normative and 
geopolitical divide will only continue to deepen moving forward. 
2. The Tallinn Manual 
Unlike the U.N. GGE process, the Tallinn Manual161 was comprised of a 
group of academics focused on how current law applies to cyber operations.162 
There was no ambition to create new rules, regimes, or norms. The project was 
pretty straightforward. The experts were to identify the law as it is at present (lex 
lata) and apply that law to a new phenomenon: cyber operations.163 
 
156. Arun Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed as Well?, 
LAWFARE ( July 4, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/un-gge-failed-international-law-
cyberspace-doomed-well [https://perma.cc/2XS7-T2LH]. 
157. Grigsby, supra note 53, at 109. 
158. Elaine Korzak, UN GGE on Cybersecurity: The End of an Era?, DIPLOMAT ( July 31, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/un-gge-on-cybersecurity-have-china-and-russia-just-made-
cyberspace-less-safe/ [https://perma.cc/2X4F-HY2L] (explaining in detail the reasons for the 
disagreement between Russia, China, Cuba, and the United States). 
159. Grigsby, supra note 53, at 113–14 (“While Washington wanted to further develop how 
concepts such as neutrality, proportionality and distinction might constrain cyber conflict, Moscow and 
Beijing saw Washington trying to find justifications in international law for the use of cyber means 
during a conflict or of conventional means as a way to respond to cyber conflict, leading to destabilising 
activity. Russian and Chinese diplomats wanted to concentrate their efforts on preventing cyber-based 
conflict in the first place, instead of setting the rules for something that should not be allowed  
to happen.”). 
160. Id. at 114 (“China, Russia and the United States fundamentally disagree over the nature of 
cyber conflict itself. Washington views cyber security as the protection of bits, software and hardware 
from unauthorised use—such as manipulating data, accessing confidential data or making data 
unavailable. In contrast, Beijing and Moscow prefer the term ‘information security’, which allows for 
state control over online content so as to preserve regime stability.”). 
161. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
162. Id. at 3 (“Tallinn Manual 2.0 examines key aspects of the public international law governing 
‘cyber operations.’”). 
163. Id. (“Tallinn Manual 2.0 is intended as an objective restatement of the lex lata. Therefore, 
the Experts involved in both projects assiduously avoided including statements reflecting lex ferenda.”) 
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The process resulted in two separate manuals. The first, released in 2013, 
focused narrowly on the international regulation of warfare.164 Questions of what 
constitutes a “use of force,”165 an “attack,”166 and a “civilian”167 were commonplace 
in the first Tallinn Manual. But this narrow approach, while relevant in armed 
conflict situations, misses a substantial chunk of state activity in cyberspace. 
Espionage,168 disruption,169 election interference,170 manipulation, and 
disinformation are just a few examples of widespread activities that would not be 
covered by warfare regulation, simply because they do not constitute war. 
This understanding led to the Tallinn Manual 2.0, released in 2017. This 
iteration broadened its methodology to include law relevant to cyber operations 
below the threshold of war. This included questions such as, at what point does a 
cyber operation violate the norm on nonintervention?171 How is sovereignty 
conceptualized in cyberspace?172 To what extent does human rights law protect 
Internet users from harmful state-sponsored activity?173 
While the experts participating in the Tallinn Manual project were able to reach 
consensus on how the law applies to cyber operations, acceptance of the Tallinn 
Manual was very thin, to say the least. Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany found that 
there was “limited support in state practice for certain key Rules of the Tallinn 
Manual, and that it is difficult to ascertain whether states accept the Tallinn Rules 
and wish them to become authoritative articulations of international law governing 
cyberoperations.”174 In other words, the Tallinn Manual, while creating a 
comprehensive and plausible set of rules, has failed in securing the acceptance of 
the international community. 
3. Other Processes 
There are several other ongoing and prospective processes that revolve around 
the creation of norms for state behavior in cyberspace. The Dutch-sponsored 
 
164. See generally TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. 
165. Id. at 42. 
166. Id. at 106–10 (rule 30). 
167. Id. at 104–05 (rule 29). 
168. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 161, at 168 (“Although peacetime cyber espionage by 
States does not per se violate international law, the method by which it is carried out might do so.”). 
169. Id. at 312–27. 
170. Id. at 313 (“This Rule addresses situations in which a State intervenes by cyber means in 
the ‘internal or external affairs’. . . . [F]or example, by using cyber operations to remotely alter electronic 
ballots and thereby manipulate an election.”). 
171. Id. at 312. 
172. Id. at 11. 
173. Id. at 179–208. 
174. Efrony & Shany, supra note 134, at 585. 
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Hague Process facilitates state follow-up on the Tallinn Manual 2.0 through an input 
process, training, and state consultation.175 
The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace is another 
nongovernmental project focused on the development of norms and rules to 
promote international peace and security in cyberspace.176 It focuses on “reaching 
new universal agreements on substantive standards for state behavior.”177 
B. From State-Centric to Tech-Centric Legal Order 
Many tech companies are becoming involved in initiatives tasked with creating 
norms, rules, principles, and guidelines for different technological conundrums. 
This trend reflects a new concept of how rules on technology are created. If in the 
past we expected state governments to perform their roles by legislating, regulating, 
creating norms, and governing, this basic premise is changing rather quickly with 
the emergence of new technologies and complex issues in cyberspace. This trend 
has two key characteristics. First, tech companies create norms. Second, these 
norms apply to the conduct of states. 
1. Norms Created by Tech Companies 
Perhaps the main evolutionary aspect in how global cybersecurity norms are 
being created is that private tech companies are the entities coming up with them. 
But private tech companies are not legislators in the classic sense, though scholars 
like Joel Reidenberg and Lawrence Lessig make it clear that architecture, or code, is 
in fact a method of regulation in cyberspace.178 It is worth remembering that these 
code regulators are for-profit corporations that seek to benefit their bottom line. 
Many of the challenges with this form of norm creation derive from tech 
exceptionalism and the inherent identity and motivation of private for-profit 
corporations: profit seeking. 
 
175. Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure 
to Advance Cyber Norms,  JUST SECURITY  ( June 30, 2017),  https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/ 
international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/  [https://perma.cc/ 
2ZPQ-W7XQ]. 
176. GLOBAL COMMISSION ON THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE, https://cyberstability.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/6FKY-349R]. 
177. Duncan Hollis & Matthew Waxman, Promoting International Cybersecurity  
Cooperation: Lessons from the Proliferation Security Initiative, 32 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 147,  
149 (2018). 
178. See Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through 
Technology, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 553, 554 (1998) (“[L]aw and government regulation are not the only source 
of rulemaking. Technological capabilities and system design choices impose rules on participants.”); see 
also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 79 (2006) (“As the world is now, code writers are 
increasingly lawmakers. They determine what the defaults of the Internet will be; whether privacy will 
be protected; the degree to which anonymity will be allowed; the extent to which access will be 
guaranteed. They are the ones who set its nature. Their decisions, now made in the interstices of how 
the Net is coded, define what the Net is.”). 
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Microsoft and other tech companies are not new to government-like roles. 
They are already undertaking many governmental and quasi-governmental tasks. 
For example, Microsoft is engaged in a public-private partnership with the  
U.S. government to take down botnets around the world.179 While some would 
certainly argue that this sort of public-private partnership is a success in that the 
U.S. government is able to fight cybercrime with the assistance of the prowess of a 
private tech company, others are concerned about the public values that are 
implicated with private companies performing certain government-like functions.180 
However, these partnerships, which the government often initiates and leads, are 
different from the phenomenon of tech companies independently creating norms 
with no substantial governmental or public oversight. 
2. Norms Applicable to State Conduct 
Private tech companies create norms, which are largely applicable to their own 
business activities. However, with the emerging privatization of cyberspace law, we 
begin to see that these norms also apply to the conduct of states in cyberspace, 
whether in offense or defense. For example, the “neutrality” principle which tech 
companies currently promote has to do with how these companies ought to treat 
states requesting assistance in carrying out cyberattacks. Under the neutrality 
principle, tech companies will treat requests from all states equally, regardless of the 
identity of the state requesting assistance. Under such neutrality, they will treat 
requests for assistance from the U.S. government, the Chinese government, the 
Russian government, or any other, indiscriminately. 
This, perhaps, does not represent a very new approach to how states seek 
expertise and assistance in carrying out certain military, law enforcement, and at 
times political operations. Rather, tech companies that have historically been 
complacent and subservient to the states’ desires are now becoming more restrictive 
and methodical on what sort of assistance and information they agree to provide  
to states. 
The positive consequence of tech companies setting the rules of the game is 
that this pushes back on certain regimes’ abuses of power and authoritarianism. 
Many tech companies have realized that to protect their consumers everywhere, 
they need to restrict state governments and their access to and control of online 
platforms, tools, and resources. 
While it is certainly desirable that tech companies reduce abuse and harmful 
state activity in cyberspace, the more problematic aspect of this trend is that states 
are ceding a lot of control to tech companies that do not share the same 
 
179. Zach Lerner, Microsoft the Botnet Hunter: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in 
Mitigating Botnets, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 250–58 (2014) (reviewing the history and legitimacy of 
the United States-Microsoft public-private partnership on botnet takedowns). 
180. See Eichensehr, supra note 12, at 504–05. 
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accountability, legitimacy, and transparency181 values as state governments, 
particularly those elected by the public.182 In other words, international lawmaking 
is being unintentionally delegated to private tech companies. 
C. A Normative Crisis 
Tech companies’ ability to restrict state governments worldwide has many 
positive aspects, but it also reflects a larger flow in the redistribution of power in 
cyberspace from states to tech companies.183 International law was traditionally 
created by states, for states. Some changes over time led to more norms and laws 
addressed at humans and their rights vis-à-vis their governments: human rights law. 
There are also many examples of “bottom-up” international lawmaking, but nothing 
of the scale and effect that tech companies’ ability to create law may have on 
cyberspace and the global legal order. This privatization of cyberspace law may 
become serious and consequential if states, the public, civil society organizations, 
and other stakeholders do not step back to consider the ramifications.184 
III. A NEW LEGAL ORDER 
We are about to see a new legal order around cyberspace and technology. Tech 
companies are not merely focused on one technology or one cyberspace issue, but 
they rather want to assimilate themselves into the machine that produces law. Some 
would argue that tech companies are performing a role that states will never be able 
to: regulating cyberspace and new technologies. Indeed, there are many indications 
that states lag behind in regulating and containing the risks of new technologies. But 
at the same time, these same states are constrained by public values and norms that 
mandate transparency, fairness, accountability, and more. States, while imperfect in 
dealing with emerging issues in cyberspace, are under a whole different set of 
normative pressures. 
This Part consists of two sections. The first explores the different values that 
typically govern state action and may therefore need to be assessed with respect to 
the privatization of cybersecurity law. The second makes some observations with 
regard to future private lawmaking on technology-related matters, calling for state 
 
181. Id. at 506 (“Government actions are also subject to scrutiny through mechanisms such as 
freedom-of-information requests and investigations by Congress or agency inspectors general.”). 
182. Id. at 505–06 (“Governmental actors operate in a system of structural checks that, although 
imperfect, constrains their actions. Government officials may be held accountable through 
congressional oversight and elections either of themselves or of higher level officers who are 
responsible for the actions of the bureaucracy.”). 
183. Id. at 504 (“The increasing transfer of government functions to private actors in recent 
decades has sparked academic and popular debate about privatization.”). 
184. Hurel & Lobato, supra note 110, at 62 (recognizing the difficulty of platforms having a 
monopoly on what they refer to as norm entrepreneurship, urging the participation of other 
stakeholders as well: “Cybersecurity is best understood as a process triggered by the practices of 
different actors, namely markets, think tanks, IT communities, governments, and security experts”). 
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governments, civil society, and Internet users to take collective action to demand 
certain safeguards to the values laid out in this Part. 
A. Privatized Cybersecurity Law & Values 
The privatization of cybersecurity law requires an in-depth examination of the 
public law values affected by the tech industry’s usurpation of the global legislative 
role.185 These values evolved as a measure to constrain governments’ power and 
overreach.186 Generally, private entities were not considered to be menacing to 
individual freedoms and other structural and normative principles such as 
accountability and transparency. But these values are either absent or significantly 
jeopardized when tech companies are performing a governmental function,187 as 
“private interests are often at odds with public law values.”188 The values discussed 
here are democratic legitimacy, transparency, privacy, neutrality, and parity. 
1. Democratic Legitimacy 
Typically, when legislatures create laws and regulators promulgate regulations, 
they enjoy a certain degree of legitimacy. However, tech companies do not possess 
an equivalent legitimacy in creating law and norms for cyberspace. Yet, the tech 
sector still creates rules and norms without it. It can do so because international law 
recognizes custom as an acceptable and primary source of law.189 
We have seen statements reflecting this notion. Mark Zuckerberg claimed that, 
“[i]n a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company. 
We have this large community of people, and more than other technology 
companies we’re really setting policies.”190 
Statements and responses such as these empower platforms to pursue  
quasi-legislative functions. State governments are not even necessarily pushing back. 
 
185. See generally Eichensehr, supra note 12. 
186. Laura Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 397, 
400 (2006) (“[T]he protections contained in the U.S. Constitution are generally viewed as prohibitions 
on state misconduct only . . . . Thus, widespread privatization potentially threatens a wide variety of 
public law values.”). 
187. However, some would argue that administrative law has long been informing the tech 
industry on how to self-regulate in a way that replicates public governance. See Kate Klonick, The New 
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1663 
(2018) (“[A]dministrative law . . . has long implicated the motivations and systems created by private 
actors to self-regulate in ways that reflect the norms of a community.”). 
188. See Eichensehr, supra note 12, at 535. 
189. Jurich, supra note 50, at 292 (“The inclusion of nonstate voices in the process allows for 
the potential of a bottom-up lawmaking process that may identify and negotiate around factors that 
private actors value.”). 
190. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY 
THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 254 (2010). 
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The Danish government recently appointed an ambassador whose role is simply to 
deal with powerful tech companies such as Facebook and Google.191 
This calls into question a variety of other concerns deriving from the 
illegitimacy of the tech sector’s endeavors. For example, what are the real interests 
behind the rules and norms prescribed by the tech sector? What degree of 
transparency should the tech sector provide when it creates, enforces, interprets, 
and amends its own rules and norms? Is the tech sector at all accountable, and if so, 
to whom? 
2. Transparency 
Transparency is often raised by scholars as one of the central values that tech 
companies ought to embrace.192 The argument goes that if tech companies are 
transparent in what, how, and why they do certain things, this may alleviate the 
information gap between them and consumers. While the importance of 
transparency in tech cannot be overstated, the obsession with transparency misses 
the bigger picture, which is that tech companies simply want to govern. The desire 
to govern is unlikely to disappear even if we achieve full transparency, because it is 
rooted in a desire for power. 
Janosik Herder, for example, suggests that we should look at tech companies 
as “biopolitical companies.”193 These biopolitical companies want to “govern 
populations” which: 
puts them at odds with democratic states that were historically thought to 
be the primary loci of biopower. Whereas the rise of platforms has 
consistently been greeted with enthusiasm for their democratizing 
potential, it may now be time to start to be concerned about the power 
platforms wield and what their power means for democratic states.194 
Transparency is important. The tech industry needs to be sincere about how 
it comes up with its proposed rules and norm for cyberspace, but this sincerity does 
not address the core issue that this Article focuses on: power. Or, more specifically, 
how power over global cybersecurity regulation is inadvertently shifting from states 
to tech companies. 
3. Privacy 
The ability of tech companies to regulate global cybersecurity raises various 
privacy-related questions, such as, what sort of data will tech companies collect 
 
191. Adam Taylor, Denmark Is Naming an Ambassador Who Will Just Deal with Increasingly 
Powerful Tech Companies, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017, 12:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/04/denmark-is-naming-an-ambassador-who-will-just-deal-with-
increasingly-powerful-tech-companies/ [https://perma.cc/GYX2-WAD3]. 
192. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 187, at 1665 (“[T]here is very little transparency from these 
private platforms.”). 
193. Herder, supra note 4. 
194. Id. 
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while acting as the guardians of cyberspace? If an industry-led CRC is to be 
established, how will it collect, use, and secure sensitive and valuable data? The 
question of privacy is overlooked in the frameworks that tech companies attempt 
to promote. There is a lot to gain from this unprecedented access to valuable data 
globally. Tech companies have an incentive to use this data for commercial 
purposes, as their cybersecurity mission also happens to be their business mission. 
Whether tech companies can respect privacy and secure the confidentiality of 
our personal information is a question of trust.195 Recent privacy violation scandals 
involving Facebook and other tech companies had negative implications on the 
trust that users are willing to afford to tech companies.196 
Privacy is not only important for its inherent value, but also because tech 
companies thrive on data and therefore have an incentive to collect and understand 
as much of it as possible.197 Frank Pasquale observes that “platforms are now 
leveraging data advantage into profits, and profits into further domination of 
advertising markets. The dynamic is self-reinforcing: more data means providing 
better, more targeted services, which in turn attracts a larger customer base, which 
offers even more opportunities to collect data.”198 This may explain the incentive 
that many tech companies have in participating in different regulatory regimes that 
can enhance their access to consumer data. 
4. Neutrality 
Can tech companies truly be neutral vis-à-vis state governments? The 
Cybersecurity Tech Accord contains a promise that the undersigned “will not help 
governments launch cyberattacks against innocent citizens and enterprises from 
anywhere.”199 As Kristen Eichensehr puts it, these tech companies “cast themselves 
as neutrals amidst competing claims by national governments and in the face of 
claims by the U.S. government for preferential treatment because of their status as 
U.S. companies.”200 Andrew Woods explains that this sort of neutrality is more 
strategic than ideological, and temporary rather than permanent.201 
The San Bernardino terrorist attack, which culminated in a dispute between 
the FBI and Apple as to the extent of assistance that Apple owed the FBI in its 
 
195. ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE 4 (2018) (“[B]ecause we share when we trust, I argue that we should start talking 
about, thinking through, and operationalizing information privacy as a social norm based on trust.”). 
196. Marietje Schaake, Beware of Tech Companies Playing Government, BLOOMBERG ( Jan. 16, 
2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-17/beware-of-tech-
companies-playing-government [https://perma.cc/T9QV-S98R] (“If we’ve learned anything from the 
scandal after scandal over Facebook Inc’s handling of user data, it is that the private sector’s noble 
intentions to regulate the internet should be met with skepticism. Without adequate public oversight of 
algorithms, and with recurring bad practices, tech platforms cannot—should not—be trusted.”). 
197. Pasquale, supra note 5, at 3. 
198. Id. 
199. A Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace, supra note 54. 
200. Eichensehr, supra note 69, at 698. 
201. Woods, supra note 111, at 5. 
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investigation, illustrates the need for neutrality. Apple may have many reasons why 
it cannot or would not help the FBI, but one of them should be that Apple will not 
give U.S. authorities preferential treatment over any competing demands from other 
state governments.202 
The question remains whether this neutrality is aspirational or practical in 
reality. U.S.-based companies are still subject to U.S. laws and regulations. Tech 
companies who operate in other foreign markets are similarly subjected to local laws 
and regulations applicable to their activity.203 It is therefore unclear whether this 
neutrality can be achieved, and if so, at what price to law enforcement and other 
state interests. 
5. Parity 
The last concern is that of parity, looking to the power dynamics between 
states and tech companies. Kristen Eichensehr asks whether tech companies are 
becoming on par with countries and says that, if this were the case, it would be 
“potentially revolutionary.”204 Eichensehr then reviews the qualities that we tend to 
associate with Westphalian sovereigns and concludes that, despite similarities to 
states, companies have not achieved perfect parity.205 This conclusion is largely 
based on the fact that tech companies lack territory,206 coercive power,207 
recognition,208 and are still “subordinate to public authorities and legal regimes 
within the states in which they operate.”209 Similarly, Andrew Woods argues that 
tech companies pose no challenge to state sovereignty at all.210 According to Woods, 
states can assert their sovereignty whenever tech companies push too far.211 These 
views miss the bigger picture, and I respectfully disagree. 
It is misguided to compare what tech companies are doing nowadays to the 
concept of Westphalian sovereignty, which dates back to the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia. No one back then anticipated that private corporations would one day 
become so powerful that their power would not even fall within the ideas of 
sovereignty conceived at Westphalia. It is true that tech companies lack the 
characteristics Eichensehr lays out, but it does not necessarily follow that they are 
not on par with states. 
 
202. See Eichensehr, supra note 69, at 698. 
203. Id. at 699. 
204. Id. at 685. 
205. Id. at 694. 
206. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165  
L.N.T.S. 19 (“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) 
a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations 
with the other states.”). 
207. See Eichensehr, supra note 69, at 684. 
208. Id. at 695. 
209. Id. 
210. Woods, supra note 111. 
211. Id. at 6. 
First to Printer_Kilovaty.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/20  8:13 PM 
1216 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1181 
However, despite tech companies’ power, they are not on an equal footing 
with states because we should use different metrics of sovereignty for states and tech 
companies. It is unlikely that tech companies will ever have independent territories 
like states, but they will become increasingly powerful despite their aterritorial 
nature. These tech companies own cyberspace “territories,” market shares, and 
industry monopolies, which may be even more significant than physical territory in 
the cybersecurity context. And while it is true that tech companies do not have a 
monopoly on the use of force, they do often act in monopolistic ways in cyberspace 
which states would not be able to. Finally, tech companies are indeed subject to the 
laws and regulation in markets where they operate, but the ability of these markets 
to reshape how tech companies operate globally is somewhat limited. Yes, nation Y 
can pass legislation to restrict the user data that platform X can collect and use. But 
nation Y cannot pass legislation that will change platform X’s business and policy 
strategy throughout the entire world.212 This is a collective action problem of sorts. 
The question of parity, therefore, is not whether tech companies are states or 
whether they have territory. Rather, it is about tech companies becoming powerful 
in their own unique way, which challenges the notions of power and coercion that 
we typically associate with states. Tech companies do not have territories, armies, 
or recognition as sovereign states, but their emerging power represents a new type 
of sovereignty—digital rather than Westphalian. As Frank Pasquale has observed, 
the tech companies’ increase in power represents a “shift from territorial to 
functional sovereignty.”213 
B. The Future of Privatized Tech Legislation 
Privatized cybersecurity law represents a single instance of tech companies 
assuming a role in regulating global cybersecurity. However, this is part of a broader 
phenomenon that has implications for future platform-sponsored initiatives to 
create law on tech-related matters. 
The phenomenon of privatized cybersecurity law may herald a broader 
phenomenon of privatized legislation, where tech companies engage in the creation 
of norms and rules that would benefit their private interests. That does not 
necessarily mean that Internet users or other consumers would suffer, but it signals 
that lax government control of these initiatives will jeopardize the public law values 
discussed infra. 
This increase in privatization is reflected in Amazon and Microsoft’s recent 
move to promote facial recognition legislation that “protects individual civil rights 
and ensures that governments are transparent in their use of facial recognition 
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technology.”214 This does not necessarily suggest that tech companies will become 
any more involved in shaping technology regulation than they have been in the past, 
but rather that they will reframe their methodology. Instead of lobbying for a certain 
agenda with legislators and regulators, tech companies will now independently offer 
“norms,” “principles,” and “guidelines” for technologies that they themselves 
develop. This will further blur the lines between government-sponsored legislation 
and platform-created norms, which will frustrate challenges to or public oversight 
of these norms. 
In addition, the privatization of tech law, which is currently the creation of 
mostly U.S.-based tech companies, will further exacerbate the current distrust 
among governments who seek to leverage their cyber offense. These governments 
may feel as if these corporate initiatives are hegemonic, under-representative, and 
therefore illegitimate.215 These privatized laws could potentially be seen as  
U.S.-sponsored norms that seek to imperialize global norms without going through 
the proper international lawmaking processes. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates the tech industry’s growing involvement in creating 
and promoting international norms and rules for global cybersecurity. While the 
case studies in this Article focus on cybersecurity, this involvement is extending into 
other areas of technology regulation, such as facial recognition, data privacy,  
and more. 
The tech industry is therefore assuming the informal role of global 
cybersecurity legislator. This privatization of cybersecurity law is one example out 
of many, reflecting the broader governmentalization of the private tech industry. 
Other stakeholders ought to be responsive to this phenomenon in order to avoid 
abuse by tech companies. As Yafit Lev-Aretz and I observed a few years ago, “if it 
talks like a government and acts like a government, it must be a tech giant.”216 
Tech companies are now using the normative vacuum left by states to step in 
and promote their own vision of global cybersecurity norms. This involves not only 
the promulgation of norms, but also the creation of institutions such as a Cyber Red 
Cross. As this Article demonstrated, this privatization of cybersecurity law has 
created some opportunities but also raised considerable issues that state 
governments, civil society actors, and Internet users need to be cognizant of. While 
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the tech industry has an important role to play in global cybersecurity, state 
governments would be wise to curb the appetite for power that some of the major 
tech companies currently have, so that values such as democratic legitimacy, 
accountability, and transparency can be effectuated. This requires further global 
efforts of creating authoritative norms through multi-stakeholder processes that 
involve a diverse set of legitimate, accountable, and transparent actors  
and ideologies. Tech companies should have a seat at the table, but they cannot be 
allowed to restrict other stakeholders from participating in the norm-creation and 
institution-building processes. 
 
 
